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Abstract. Networks are difficult to configure correctly, and tricky to debug. These
problems are accentuated by temporal and stateful behavior. Static verification,
while useful, is ineffectual for detecting behavioral deviations induced by hardware
faults, security failures, and so on, so dynamic property monitoring is also valuable.
Unfortunately, existing monitoring and runtime verification for networks largely
focuses on properties about individual packets (such as connectivity) or requires a
digest of all network events be sent to a server, incurring enormous cost.
We present a network monitoring system that avoids these problems. Because
traces of network events correspond well to temporal logic, we use a subset
of Metric First-Order Temporal Logic as the query language. These queries are
compiled down to execute completely on the network switches. This vastly reduces
network load, improves the precision of queries, and decreases detection latency.
We show the practical feasibility of our work by extending a widely-used software
switch and deploying it on networks. Our work also suggests improvements to
network instruction sets to better support temporal monitoring.
1 Introduction
Network configurations are challenging to get right, and can be difficult [30,39] to debug.
Not only do they dictate static forwarding and packet-filtering behavior, they also control
dynamic, stateful features such as shortest-path routing, network-address translation,
caching for various protocols, and more. Given the ubiquity and criticality of networks,
operators must be able to develop confidence in their configuration.
The difficulty is compounded in Software Defined Networks (SDNs), where operators
can write their own controller programs to govern switch behavior. Not only is network
behavior now defined by programs rather than configurations (which tend to be of
limited expressive power and thus more amenable to reasoning [2,11,14,20,22,29]), but
the mechanics of SDN itself induce new types of bugs [18,32] that must be addressed.
Static network-property checking tools like VeriFlow [15] and NetPlumber [14] are
powerful, but limited in scope to to stateless forwarding policies. Static tools designed
specifically for SDNs will also function weakly at best in a hybrid network that uses
both SDN and traditional elements. Factors like mis-connected cables [13], external
attacks, and complex hardware problems [18] further demonstrate that static tools are
complementary to and must be supported by strong runtime checks.
Purpose-built middleboxes, such as intrusion-detection systems, monitor and react
to traffic efficiently—often at line rate or close to it. But these are costly, lack general-
purpose flexibility, and sit at least one step removed from the forwarding performed
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by the switches. High-performance Network Function Virtualization (NFV) solutions
(e.g. [23,31]) are now able to process traffic at or near line rate (10Gpbs), but still
require traffic to be rerouted through them. Another class of monitoring tools, including
NetSight [12] and Simon [28], send digests of packets seen to a central server—an
approach that adds flexibility while incurring significant cost.
Narayana, et al. [26] introduce a different technique: compiling regular-expression
path queries down to rules executed by switches. However, path queries are limited to
expressing how a single packet traverses the network, independent of history. History is
vital for monitoring the stateful behavior of protocols and applications. A central server
might support stateful queries by updating stateless rules on each switch as needed, but
this approach increases latency, server load, and risk that the monitor will be impacted
by reordering, retransmission, or other eccentricities of the network.
Instead, we present Varanus, a novel system for stateful runtime verification of
network-control programs: compiling temporal queries in their entirety to the switches
themselves. Our switch-centric capture approach has several key advantages. It:
– reduces load on the controller and/or monitoring server;
– decreases latency of detection and state-transition, which also lessens the potential
for unsound results (Sec. 7);
– avoids potential event re-ordering induced by transmission to a central server; and
– increases the expressive power of queries by exposing how the switch transforms an
arriving packet into a departing packet, without resorting to unsound methods such
as comparing payload-hashes [12].
This approach is challenging because switches are optimized to match and forward
packets as quickly as possible, limiting the expressive power of rules they can execute. In
fact, current standard switch-rule formats are entirely stateless, making temporal-query
compilation unworkable. Nevertheless, switches do have non-trivial computational re-
sources: a slower, more expressive tier of processing sits above its fast, limited matching
capabilities in order to handle rule-updates from the controller and other operations
that cannot be performed at line rate. Varanus takes advantage of this, conservatively
extending switch rules to support a constrained subset of Metric Temporal Logic, re-
taining fast match capabilities at the lower tier while performing state updates in the
higher tier—balancing expressiveness with performance. We demonstrate feasibility by
modifying a popular software switch and deploying queries in a network.
2 Queries: Examples, Syntax, Semantics, and Expressive Power
Before detailing Varanus’s query syntax and semantics, we first motivate temporal
queries with a small example: monitoring a stateful-firewall SDN application.
2.1 Queries by Example
A stateful firewall blocks packets that arrive on external ports unless they are part of a
connection initiated from the internal network. Compared to most network applications,
a stateful firewall is relatively simple, yet its implementation could contain many bugs:
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outgoing traffic or valid incoming traffic could be rejected (resulting in a connectivity
failure), or invalid external traffic could be permitted (a security threat). For simplicity,
we limit the firewall switch to two ports: internal and external. We also introduce a
black-listed external host with network address 192.0.2.1. We now have a number of
correctness properties; for instance:
1. Packets from host 192.0.2.1 never egress the firewall.
2. Packets arriving at an internal port are always forwarded to the external port.
3. After a packet from internal host A to external host B arrives at an internal port,
packets from B to A arriving at an external port will be output on the internal port
for the next ten seconds.
4. If no packet from internal host A to external host B has previous arrived at an internal
port, packets from B to A at an external port will be dropped.
We wish to monitor the network for counterexamples, i.e., traces of network events that
falsify each property.
Property 1 If the switch never modifies the IP source field, then this property can be
monitored by a single stateless packet filter that checks for blacklisted packets departing
from the firewall. The corresponding query is:
1 see p: egress | p.nwSrc = 192.0.2.1
which notifies the monitor when the switch observes a packet egress with source network
address 192.0.2.1—either to raise an alert or to trigger further processing.
Property 2 In contrast to the prior property, this one requires state: the system only
incurs an obligation to forward a packet once it has arrived. Detecting when this property
fails means looking for cases when a packet egresses in an unexpected way (e.g., it is
dropped). Thus, we now have a sequence of two observations:
1 see p: arrival | p.locPt = 1 // Internal port
2 see p’: egress same | p’.locPt != 2 // External port
These lines should be read with an implicit “followed by” between them. The identifier
p matches an arbitrary packet arrival at the internal port (1). Next, p’ matches when the
packet is not seen departing the external port (2). The same annotation specifies that p’
must be an egress for the packet identified in the previous arrival observation (p). The
second observation depends on the first; a given egress only discharges the obligation
incurred by its preceding arrival.
Property 3 The obligation in this property is only incurred after multiple distinct packets:
1 see p1: arrival | p1.locPt = 1
2 see p2: arrival within 10 | p2.locPt = 2, p2.nwSrc = p1.nwDst,
3 p2.nwDst = p1.nwSrc
4 see p2’: egress same | p2’.locPt != 1
The identifier p1 matches a packet arriving at the internal port, which should open a
hole in the firewall for return traffic. p2 is a corresponding return packet arriving on the
external port within 10 seconds of p1. The observation for p2’ matches when p2 does not
depart on port 1, meaning it was not forwarded to the internal network.
3
QUERY ::= LISTOF(OBSERVATION)
OBSERVATION ::=
"see" ID ":" TYPE "|" PREDICATE |
"not see" ID ":" TYPE "|" PREDICATE |
"not see" ID "|" PREDICATE
"until" see ID ":" TYPE "|" PREDICATE |
PREDICATE ::= LISTOF(ATOMIC)
ATOMIC ::= TERM "=" TERM | TERM "!=" TERM
TERM ::= NUM | ID.FIELD
TYPE ::= "arrival" | "arrival within" NUM |
"egress" | "egress within" NUM | "egress same"
FIELD ::= dlTyp | dlSrc | dlDst | nwSrc | nwDst | nwProto | ...
Fig. 1: Query syntax. Non-terminals are capitalized, and LISTOF(X) denotes a list of expressions
matching non-terminal X. FIELD matches any valid packet field name.
Property 4 Here, a counterexample must contain no analogue to p1 in the above:
1 not see p1 | p1.locPt = 1, p2.nwSrc = p1.nwDst, p2.nwDst = p1.nwSrc
2 until see p2: arrival | p2.locPt = 2
3 see p2’: egress same | p2’.locPt = 1
The first observation (lines 1–2) matches an incoming packet p2 on the external port,
provided that no packet p1 (bearing reversed addresses) has previously arrived at the
internal port. p2’ then observes that p2 has erroneously been forwarded.
Even these short examples require non-trivial features: recognizing chains of related
observations, time-dependence, detecting when two events involve the same packet,
negative observations, awareness of prior events, etc.
2.2 Syntax
A query comprises an ordered list of observations [O1, ..., On], each of which matches a
network event (a positive observation) or lack of an event within some period of time
(a negative observation). Each observation has a type: either a packet arrival or packet
egress (possibly with temporal constraints).
Each observation also contains a trigger event identifier and a match predicate which
references that identifier and (optionally) identifiers of prior positive observations. Also,
until observations contain a blocking event identifier and a corresponding blocking
predicate. Each predicate consists of a set of literals. Fig. 1 gives the complete grammar.
To be well-formed, a query [O1, ..., On] must also satisfy the following:
– every negative observation has a within annotation;
– the same type annotation only occurs with egress;
– every egress same observation is preceded by a positive arrival observation;
– each Oi, Oj (i 6= j) are labeled by different identifiers; and
– each Oi’s predicate refers only to its own identifier and (optionally) identifiers of
prior observations Oj (j ≤ i).
These ensure key semantic requirements, e.g., every term is bound before it is used.
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2.3 Semantics
Queries match traces of events in the network. Observations within a query match
individual events or timeouts in the context of a trace. To make this precise, we first
introduce some notation.
An event is one of: a packet arrival, a packet egress, a clock tick (written as TICK ),
or the no-op event (⊥) which the semantics uses as a placeholder when no event has
yet occurred. A timestamp is a non-negative integer value. A trace is a finite sequence
of (event, timestamp) pairs with monotonically non-decreasing timestamps. For a trace
T , we use pii(T ) to refer to the ith event in a trace and τi(T ) to refer to its timestamp.
suffixk(T ) denotes the suffix of T obtained by removing the leading k elements. We
omit the application “(T )” where the trace is clear from context.
Each query has a fixed set of query terms R: the e.fld expressions that occur within
its observations. Since there are finitely many observations in a query, and only finitely
many valid field names, the set of query terms is always finite. To project out individual
field values from events, we use a partial function getf : Events×FIELD → NUM .
If an event e does not contain a field f, then getf(e, f) is undefined. We use O(e) to
indicate an observation whose match identifier is e; for an until observation, this is the
identifier in the second position, i.e., the trigger. We assume traces contain a discrete
tick event for each positive integer i, denoted (TICK , i); this is for convenience in the
formalism for observations using within, which in practice (Sec. 5) will be implemented
via switch-rule timeouts.
For every query Q and trace T , we now define whether T satisfies Q (written as
T |= Q). Since Q is a sequence of observations [O1, ..., On], we must also define
whether T satisfies each observation Oi. But whether T |= Oi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) may depend
on when and how previous observations were satisfied: Oi may reference field values
bound by O1, ..., Oi−1, and may also, via within keyword, depend on the time since the
last observation was satisfied. We provide this past-time context via an environment η,
which maps syntactic query terms to concrete values such as packet fields. For instance, η
may map p1.nwDst (the network destination address of the event bound to p1) to 10.0.0.1.
Fig. 2 defines the meaning of a query via a logical satisfaction (|=) relation, similarly
to temporal logic. Since this semantics introduces numerous parameters, for brevity we
write T |= Q for T |=∅,0,⊥ Q, omitting the initial environment, last-match timestamp,
and last-match event.
2.4 Expressive Power
Since Varanus’s language can match sequences of events, it has a clear expressive
advantage over existing work that focuses only on stateless monitoring. Implementations
of real world protocols, such as ARP and DHCP, as well as bespoke SDN controller
programs require a stateful monitoring language. While more expressive monitoring
solutions exist, such as Simon [28], these approaches are not conducive to switch-based
state management. (Sec. 6 discusses other work in more detail.) Our language provides a
novel middle-ground: meeting the expressive demands of stateful monitoring while also
achieving the benefits of switch-based capture.
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Atomic Formulas (m) and Predicates (C) match an event with respect to an environment.
pi |=η e.f = c ⇐⇒ getf(pi, f) = c
pi |=η e.f1 = e.f2 ⇐⇒ getf(pi, f1) = getf(pi, f2)
pi |=η e.f1 = t ⇐⇒ getf(pi, f1) = η(t)
(if t a term that is neither c nor e.f2)
pi |=η t1 != t2 ⇐⇒ pi 6|=η t1 = t2
pi |=η m1, ..., mk ⇐⇒ ∀mi.pi |=η mi
Event Types (Y) match a trace position with respect to an environment,
a last-match timestamp, a last-match event, and an operator (≤ or =).
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,op arrival ⇐⇒ pii is a packet arrival
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,op egress ⇐⇒ pii is a packet egress
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,op arrival within D ⇐⇒ pii is a packet arrival, and τi op (lτ +D)
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,op egress within D ⇐⇒ pii is a packet egress, and τi op (lτ +D)
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,op egress same ⇐⇒ pii is a packet egress, and I(lpi, pii)
Observations (O) match a trace position with respect to an environment,
a last-match timestamp, and a last-match event.
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi see e : Y | C ⇐⇒ T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,≤ Y and pii |=η C
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi not see e : Y | C ⇐⇒ T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,= Y , pii = TICK , and
∀j(0 ≤ j < i), pij 6|=η C
T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi not see e1 | C1 T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi,≤ Y , pii |=η C2 and
until see e2 : Y | C2 ⇐⇒ ∀j(0 ≤ j < i), either
T, j 6|=η,lτ ,lpi,≤ Y or pij 6|=η+[e2,pij ] C1
Queries (Q) match traces with respect to an environment, a last timestamp, and a last event.
T |=η,lτ ,lpi O1(e1), ..., On ⇐⇒ ∃i ≥ 0 |T, i |=η,lτ ,lpi O1, and
suffixi+1 |=η+[e1,pii],τi,pii O2, ..., On
Fig. 2: Logical Semantics for Queries, Observations, event types, predicates and atomic formulas.
We use η + [e, pi] as shorthand for η[∀f ∈ FIELD, e.fld 7→ getf(pii, f)], i.e., environment
η extended by the fields of pi under identifier e. The symmetric binary relation on events, I ,
represents whether two events involve the same packet.
Comparison to Temporal Logic Our query language comprises a strict subset of Metric
First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL) [4] that is conducive to execution on switches.
In essence, positive observations correspond to F (“finally”) or U (“until”) formulas,
and negative observations to G (“globally”) formulas, with later observations nesting.
Forward references in until observations can be expressed in MFOTL using existen-
tial variables. For instance, not see e1 | e1.nwSrc = e2.nwDst until see e2: arrival
corresponds to ∃x.¬(src = x)U[0,inf) (dst = x). The fixed temporal structure of
queries—observation followed by observation—leads to restricted formula nesting in
the equivalent MFOTL, easing compilation while sacrificing expressive power. For
example, there is no equivalent query for the MFOTL formula Fα ∧ Fβ. Also, while
the within keyword allows observations to be satisfied at any point within the interval
[0, D], MFOTL allows both ends of intervals to be specified. This limitation makes it
possible to compile within via switch rule timeouts (Sec. 4).
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App Property N? IE? U?
Learning Never flood after destination learned
Switch Once destination learned, send out correct port
NAT NAT ports used consistently once assigned 3
ARP No new requests generated for cached addresses
Cache Requests for cached addresses always replied to 3
If no prior request received, propagated on core ports 3 3
VLAN Once a tag is seen on a port, never see another
and misc. See at most k distinct tags on any port
tagging Untagged packets always tagged before departure on trunk 3
Tagged packets always de-tagged before departure on access port
Port Knocking Recognize correct knocking sequence 3
Knocking packets should be dropped 3
Fig. 3: Select additional stateful queries, beyond those in Sec. 2.1, which fit our language. Columns
1 and 2 name the specific program and property. Additional columns contain a 3 if the query uses
negative observations (N?), ingress-egress pairing (IE?), or until observations (U?).
Additional Examples To demonstrate the broad applicability of this technique, Fig. 3
lists additional stateful properties for five example applications not seen in Sec. 2.1: (1)
a learning switch, which learns how to reach new destinations as it observes traffic; (2)
a Network Address Translation (NAT) application, which masquerades multiple hosts
as a single address; (3) an Address Resolution Protocol cache, which facilitates fast
lookup between layer 2 and layer 3 addresses; (4) a packet-tagging application; and (5)
port knocking, which allows traffic from external hosts that send a pre-specified packet
sequence. Each of these safety properties can be expressed as a query in Varanus.
3 Queries as Automata
We now show how a query can be realized as a non-deterministic automaton over event
traces. This fact will be useful for compilation: in Sec. 4 we will see that each state of
these automata can be represented as a set of switch rules.
Intuitively, a state of such an automaton carries several things: (1) which observation
was last matched; (2) the current environment; (3) a set of forbidden environments;
(4) a last-match event; and (5) a last-match timestamp. Much of this state-construction
echoes the semantics in Sec. 2; the only exception is (3), which allows the automaton to
remember previously seen events that matched the blocking part of an until observation.
Given a query Q = [O1, ..., On], let H(R) be the set of all environments over the
query terms R of Q and let |Q| be the set {O1, ..., Qn}. The query automaton for Q,
denoted by AQ, is the non-deterministic automaton (S,Σ, δ, s0, F ) where:
1. the set of states S is (|Q|×H(R)×2H(R)×Event×N)∪{(O0, ∅, ∅,⊥, 0)} (where
O0 is a distinct value representing “no observations satisfied”);
2. Σ is a set of possible (event, timestamp) trace elements;
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*-{C,(TICK, ℓτ+ D)} 
(TICK,  ℓτ+ D) Wait for D
to pass
not see e: Y within D | C 
loop
ok
δi = δ
loop
i ∪ δoki
δloopi = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ))
for every η, η̂, lpi , lτ , pi, and τ
unless pi |=η C or (pi=TICK and τ = lτ +D)
δoki = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi+1, η + [e, pi], ∅, pi, τ))
where pi = TICK and τ = lτ +D}
Fig. 4: Producing the non-deterministic transition relation for a query [O1, ..., On]. The notation
A− [e] means the subset of match predicate A with all literals involving event e removed. For
space, we show only the not see within case here; Appendix A contains the full table.
Wait for p2
η = ∅
η = {(nwSrc=10.1.1.1, 
        nwDst=10.1.1.2)}
̂
Ingress: locPt=1 
nwSrc=10.1.1.1
nwDst=10.1.1.2
>
Wait for p2
η = ∅
η = ∅̂
Wait for p2'
η = ∅̂
Ingress: locPt=2 
nwSrc=10.1.1.3
nwDst=10.1.1.4
η = {(p2.nwSrc=10.1.1.3, 
        p2.nwDst=10.1.1.4)}
Event A Event B
πl = Bπl =⊥ 
πl =⊥ 
Fig. 5: Example run of the automaton for Property 4 (timer details omitted). The starting state has
empty η and η̂ and waits for p2. When a packet (A) matching p1 arrives, the new state continues
waiting for p2, but has learned a forbidden environment. Since (B) matches p2 but does not match
the forbidden environment, it advances the state to waiting for p2’. If B egresses (not shown) at
port 1, the automaton advances to an accepting state.
3. δ is a relation on S ×Σ × S (the transition relation);
4. s0 = (O0, ∅, ∅,⊥, 0) is the unique starting state; and
5. the set of accepting states F = {(o, η, η̂, pi, τ)|o = On}; i.e., all states for which the
final observation has been matched.
If δ is undefined for a particular state and input, the automaton is said to halt on
that pair. The automaton accepts a trace if there is some run on the trace that ends in an
accepting state. Given a finite-branching transition relation, every finite trace induces only
finitely many runs. The transition relation δ is defined as δ =
⋃
1≤i<n δi, and each δi is
defined for each observation Oi. Fig. 4 gives δi for one type of observation; Appendix A
provides the full definition. The automata produced here are quite limited: the only
cycles they contain are self loops, and environments grow monotonically as each run
evolves. Furthermore, δ is finite-branching. The only subtlety is in η̂, which represents
forbidden bindings accumulated in the course of matching an until observation. Fig. 5
demonstrates a partial run of the automaton for Property 4 of Sec. 2.1. Query automata
correspond closely to queries, as the following theorem (proven in Appendix B) shows:
Theorem 1. Let T be a trace and Q = [O1, ..., On] a query. Then T |= Q ⇐⇒ AQ
accepts T .
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The Role of Non-determinism in this Domain Non-determinism allows multiple runs
of AQ to co-exist. Consider the query:
1 see p1: arrival | p1.nwSrc = 10.1.1.1
2 see p2: arrival | p2.nwDst = p1.nwDst
executed over a trace containing packets with multiple destination addresses. Each
destination will produce a distinct environment binding p1.nwDst, necessitating multiple
states be “active” at any one time. Timers also make heavy use of non-determinism, even
for queries where no environment is needed. For instance:
1 see p1: arrival | p1.nwSrc = 10.1.1.1
2 see p2: arrival within 5 | p2.nwDst = 10.1.1.2
3 see p3: arrival within 5 | p3.nwSrc = p3.nwDst
This query is entirely positive, and requires no environment to evaluate—the constraints
on p2 are not dependent on p1. Suppose we execute it on the following event trace:
t=0: nwSrc = 10.1.1.1, nwDst = 10.1.1.5 [matches p1]
t=4: nwSrc = 10.1.1.1, nwDst = 10.1.1.2 [matches p1,p2]
t=8: nwSrc = 10.1.1.10, nwDst = 10.1.1.2 [matches p2]
t=10: nwSrc = 10.1.1.3, nwDst = 10.1.1.3 [matches p3]
Any individual run will time out after 5 seconds of waiting for p2, but non-deterministic
automata can have multiple simultaneous states. This allows the wait for p2 to be extended
via a new state at t=4, enabling the capture of p2 at t=8. (The logical semantics enable
this via “for some i” in the Q portion of Fig. 2.) Rather than attempting to determinize
query automata, we will embrace non-determinism and use it explicitly in our compiler.
4 Compilation
Varanus generates switch rules in an extension of OpenFlow [24], a widely-used protocol
that allows the controller to install persistent forwarding rules on switches. The OpenFlow
protocol is widely supported both by major hardware vendors, and by software switches
such as Open vSwitch [33]. Because of this extensive support, our compiler targets
OpenFlow, although the approach is not OpenFlow specific.
The OpenFlow standard continues to evolve, and individual vendors also extend
the protocol to provide new features. Our work fits into this culture of extension, using
monitoring to explore the benefits of carefully increasing the OpenFlow instruction set.
4.1 Background
In OpenFlow1, the rules that dictate switch behavior are held in ordered collections
called tables. An OpenFlow rule is a tuple (D,T,M,A) consisting of an optional hard
timeout duration, a table identifier, a set of match criteria, and a set of actions to perform
if the rule is matched. Match criteria are predicates that match packet fields against
values, possibly with wildcarding. For instance, a rule might match packets with source
1 “OpenFlow” without a version modifier will henceforth refer to a simplified version of Open-
Flow 1.3, atop which we implement our changes.
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IP address 10.1.1.* and destination TCP port 80. Actions include forwarding the
packet out a constant port (out(k)), overwriting a packet field with a constant value
(fld:=val), resubmitting the packet to a constant table (resubmit(t)), and sending
the packet to the controller for further instructions (controller). Rules also contain
a numeric priority, which we abstract out and give implicitly via list ordering.
When a packet arrives, it is submitted to table 0. Within each table, the highest-
priority matching rule applies, and its actions are added to the overall action set. The
switch performs all actions in the set, in a fixed order (i.e., field modifications before
output), once no further table resubmits are mandated. The graph of resubmits must be
acyclic. An empty action set results in a dropped packet. If the packet matches no rule in
any table, it is sent to the controller. Crucially, this packet-evaluation process leverages
the limited expressive power of rules to process packets quickly, whether via specialized
data-structures in software or optimized hardware. Only cache-misses and modifications
to the rule-set need pass through a switch’s slower general-purpose datapath.
In effect, these simple static rules are a cache of controller instructions, which may be
proactively installed. In standard OpenFlow, only the controller, and not the switch itself,
can modify or install rules. This provides a clear separation of concerns between switch
and controller, but leads to increased latency and load. Different dynamic-rule extensions
have been proposed, which we compare in Sec. 6. Open vSwitch also implements a
dynamic extension: the “learn” action, which allows a rule, when matched, to install a
new rule that does not itself use the learn action. Our own extensions build atop this.
4.2 Rule Extensions with Dynamic Actions
Varanus extends the learn action to allow learned rules to themselves have learn actions,
i.e., we enable nesting rules to be learned up to arbitrary bounded depth. Concretely, we
extend OpenFlow as follows: an OpenFlow+ rule is a tuple (D,T,M,A,O) where O is
an action set to perform on rule timeout. Other components are identical to OpenFlow,
except that the set of permitted actions in A is larger, including deleting all rules in the
current table (delete all), incrementing an atomic counter (inc(c)), and learning
a new rule (learn(r)). Table identifiers are split between ingress and egress tables;
egress tables apply immediately before the packet departs (or is dropped by) the switch.
4.3 Compiling to Switches
To realize AQ as a set of OpenFlow+ rules, Varanus produces an initial rule set that
embodies the automaton’s starting state. It contains, via nested learn actions, a blueprint
for all possible runs of AQ. Since the switch accumulates an action set from all tables
before discharging the packet, this gives us a way to implement non-determinism: every
table corresponds to an active run of AQ. Separate table spaces for ingress and egress
maintain the distinction between arrival and egress events.
Consider a run of AQ in state S = (Oi, η, η̂, lτ , lpi). If S is an accepting state, no
rules are required; the monitor will have been notified on transitioning to S. If S is not
accepting, there are four varieties of transitions to cover: (1) true self-loops (defined
by each δloop in Fig. 4); (2) halting; (3) forward transitions from an Oi state to a Oi+1
state (δok in Fig. 4); and (4) in the case of until, blocking self-loops that rule out
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potential forward transitions but remain in a state with the same Oi component (δblock
in Appendix A’s Fig. 7). The compiler addresses these as follows:
(1) Self-loops are the default; if an event matches no rules, no action is taken.
(2) A run halts in two cases: when a timed positive observation times out, or a negative
observation is matched. The compiler realizes these by adding a timeout to corre-
sponding rules. For positive observations, the timeout erases the rules; for negative
observations, forward-transitions execute on timeout and matching packets delete
the rules. Since tables correspond to runs of AQ, deleting a table removes that run.
(3) Forward transitions use either the learn action (to learn rules into a fresh table) or
the controller action (to notify the monitor that the query has been satisfied).
(4) To realize the blocking transitions for until observations, the compiler adds an
extra, low-priority rule that, as blocking events are seen, learns new rules to block
corresponding packets from triggering forward transitions.
The Varanus compiler recursively descends through each observation, building a
corresponding set of switch rules. Where match predicates involve negative literals, the
compiler inserts shadow rules before the trigger rule that advances the state. Since only
one rule per table can apply, these block the trigger from applying.
Observations in a query can reference previously seen events, but switch rules
cannot carry an environment directly. To bridge this gap, we exploit techniques used for
compiling the lambda calculus: substitution and De Bruijn indices [9]. The compiler
embeds current values via substitution as new rules are learned. To prevent premature
substitution, every field reference in switch rules also carries a deferral value. Where
De Bruijn indices count how many bindings away a variable was bound, deferral values
count the number of learn actions to wait before substituting. Our extensions to OVS
read these deferral values when learning, perform substitution if it is zero, and otherwise
decrement it in the new learned rule. Appendix C gives the algorithm in full.
5 Implementation and Evaluation
Our implementation comprises the compiler of Sec. 4 and a version of the Open
vSwitch [33] software that has been modified to support OpenFlow+. We also use
a proxy between the switch and any controller applications (such as the stateful firewall
in Sec. 2.1), allowing us receive query notifications and place any application-installed
rules between our compiled ingress and egress tables. We optimize pairs of ingress
/egress same observations by using switch registers to maintain ingress field values as
needed; this allows us to avoid queuing packets until all learn actions are complete.
The full version of OpenFlow involves advanced features not mentioned above; we
have discarded these for simplicity in our prototype. Consequently, our ability to detect
egresses is limited to packets emitted on zero, one, or all ports (i.e., not multicast).
Performance Evaluation
The key performance metric in our approach is the time required to match packets in our
query tables, which directly affects forwarding latency. This additional latency includes
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Fig. 6: CDF of latency for a base installation of Open vSwitch (OVS) and our modified switch
with support for OpenFlow+ rules (OF+). Our evaluation measured the latency to process a
new connection for a number of new connections per second (NC) and with rule timeouts of 1
second (left) and 10 seconds (right), shown on a log scale. Evaluating OpenFlow+ rules at 128
connections/sec with 10 second timeouts (not fully pictured) shows prohibitively high latencies in
the 1-10sec range.
the time to execute our modified learn actions, and the time to evaluate a packet in
each active table. Since the time to execute our modified learn actions does not differ
significantly from the time to execute a standard learn action, we focus on the number
of active tables. Critically, the number of tables affects all packets processed by Open
vSwitch’s tables, not just those that match a query observation. To quantify the latency
introduced by adding tables, we created a test network using an installation of Open
vSwitch with our extensions and two hosts running in Mininet [19].
OVS maintains a low-level cache of actions for packets already processed by rule
tables. In order to focus on the packets most affected by our modifications, we manufac-
ture a worst-case situation by creating a large number of fresh TCP connections, which
result in cache misses, each of which causes all tables to be evaluated. We measured
the latency of rules that allocate a new table for each new TCP connection entering the
switch, similar to the stateful-firewall queries of Sec. 2.1. We generated traffic using
ovs-benchmark [33], a performance measurement tool included with Open vSwitch,
and captured traffic with the tshark packet-analysis tool. We examined the round
trip time for the first two packets in the TCP handshake, which is the portion of the
connection that must be processed by the slow path. To understand how the latency
changes based on the number of active runs of the automaton, we varied the numbers of
new connections per second and the duration of the timeout on installed rules. (With-
out timeouts, the amount of query state retained increases monotonically as packets
are processed, which becomes intractable.) For each set of parameters, we conducted
measurements for 5 minutes of constant traffic at the specified rate, which we express as
a CDF in Fig. 6.
To provide a baseline for the performance of the learn action, we use an unmodified
OVS installation learning new rules into a single table for each new TCP connection
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seen. In unmodified OVS, the learn action has a latency of about 1 millisecond, due to the
need to perform an expensive rule table update for each packet. This latency increases
based on the number of new connections and rules in the table, as shown in Fig. 6.
The difference between the baseline implementation and Varanus is reflected in
Fig. 6 as the horizontal distance between OVS (dashed lines) and OpenFlow+ (solid
lines), and is due to the added cost of maintaining and evaluating multiple OpenFlow+
tables. In our test network, traffic at 64 new connections per second with 1 second
rule timeouts can be handled by about 500 tables (one for each of the 8 packets in
each ovs-benchmark TCP connection within the one-second window) and incurs a
latency under 1 ms. 128 new connections per second, requiring 1000 tables, are each
handled within 10ms. For the 10 second timeout case, the latencies are much higher due
to the increased number of active tables; at 128 connections per second with 10 second
timeouts, we reach the resource limit of our test switch at approximately 8000 tables,
which presents as an unacceptably high latency (on the order of tens of seconds), since
uncached table evaluation cannot keep up with the new traffic.
These measurements indicate that Varanus can be practical on a small network;
we allow the user to select suitable timeout values for their queries, as they are in the
best position to know both their needs and what their environment can support. Sec. 7
discusses future work on alternative approaches that improve scaling on larger networks.
6 Related Work
Metric temporal logics have been used previously for runtime verification, notably by
Basin, et al. [4], whose MonPoly tool monitors a richer subset of MFOTL formulas—
including unrestricted nesting and two-sided intervals—than our approach. Kim, et
al. [17] also give a runtime program monitoring framework, MaC, with a query language
inspired by past-time LTL with intervals. Their language adds state via “auxiliary vari-
ables”, which are updated as a monitoring script progresses through an event stream.
MaC’s support for time intervals and aggregation is superior to ours, but as auxiliary
variables are limited to basic Java types (e.g., numbers), the language cannot support
branching caused by non-deterministic interleaving (Sec. 3). The Eagle [3] monitoring
logic is also more expressive than ours, allowing the definition of new temporal opera-
tors. Deshmukh, et al. [10] perform off-line system monitoring using Signal Temporal
Logic, which enables checking quantitative, rather than strictly Boolean, properties. All
these works assume a standard Turing-complete execution target. In contrast, Varanus
integrates with existing switch software to minimize the impact of on-line capture and
stateful filtering. General monitoring tools also neglect network-domain distinctions
such as the connection between packet ingress and corresponding egress.
Simon [28] provides a scriptable, interactive monitoring framework for SDN pro-
grams. However, Simon runs on a centralized server, which means all packet events
on the network must be communicated to this server, whereas our approach reduces
load and improves event granularity. Events generated by Varanus could be provided to
Simon streams for further processing and interactive exploration.
Narayana, et al. [26] compile “path queries” about packet forwarding to switches.
Path queries, by their nature, are distributed across multiple switches, whereas we
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compile stateful queries only for single switches. Path queries are restricted to regular
expressions over possible forwarding paths, and so cannot express the array of stateful
properties that Varanus targets, but do not require extensions to OpenFlow.
DMaC [41] extends MaC to networking by compiling MaC properties to Network
Datalog [21]. DMaC can describe both stateful and path-specific properties, and can
monitor behavior across multiple switches, whereas our properties are single-switch.
DMaC requires that switch state and traffic information be made available in a form it can
query, and executes via a custom Datalog engine on software switches. Since our goal
is to filter for temporal packet sequences on optimized switch software—with minimal
impact on forwarding speed—our switch-rule based approach differs significantly.
NetSight [12] captures packet trajectories by capturing digests for each packet,
which are processed off-switch. As our work focuses on compiling temporal, multi-
packet queries to switches, it is largely orthogonal, but our extensions to switch rules
potentially provide NetSight with a means to reduce the number of packet digests
produced. Moreover, NetSight differentiates packets by hashing, whereas our approach
allows a more fine-grained distinction.
Production SDN monitoring fabrics, such as BigTap [7], are limited to operations sup-
ported by current versions of OpenFlow, and thus cannot avail themselves of switch-side
stateful monitoring. Planck [35] and other sampling approaches deliberately compro-
mise on completeness in the face of intrinsic network constraints. We do not sample
deliberately, although overfull switch queues can manifest similarly (Sec. 7).
Numerous other tools (e.g., [34,1,42]) perform runtime monitoring, but either lack
compilation to switches or monitor only single-packet paths through the network. Others
(e.g., [36,38,40]) focus on data analysis after the fact, rather than real-time monitoring.
FAST [25], OpenState [6], and POF [37] conservatively extend the power of Open-
Flow rules. In all of these, switches maintain additional “per-flow” state. A flow is
defined by matching a set of header fields, giving a fixed equivalence relation on traffic:
equivalent packets use the same index into the state table. While some of our queries
could be compiled to these extensions, in general our equivalence relation needs to vary
with the current state—one observation may match on IP source address, another on TCP
port. FAST and OpenState both assume a deterministic automaton for state evolution,
and so using them would prevent us from leveraging non-determinism as we do. The
P4 [8] language also allows limited state on switches, in the form of persistent registers.
Our state is more self contained since rules can only learn fresh rules or delete their own
table (Sec. 4), rather than affecting other rules—as is possible via shared registers.
Purely static tools, such as network configuration analyzers [2,20,14,22,11,29] and
languages built for analysis (e.g., [16,27]) are powerful but not sufficient for robust
network testing. Veriflow [15] statically analyzes updates to (stateless) OpenFlow switch
rules in real time. This hybrid approach is nevertheless limited to switches governed by
an SDN controller. Since our approach only collects events on SDN switches, it can be
used even in a hybrid network. Beckett et al. [5] enhance SDN programs with annotations
that reference program state directly. These compile to new VeriFlow assertions as the
program state changes, and are therefore limited to analyzing switch-rule updates.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
To our knowledge, Varanus is the first work to enable runtime verification of SDN
programs by compiling cross-packet, temporal queries directly to switches. At the
moment, we have focused mainly on query expressiveness, yet have kept our extensions
to OpenFlow narrow in order to limit detrimental effects on forwarding speed.
While some monitoring goals can be met by installing middleboxes at the network
edge, runtime verification of SDN applications—which govern the entire network—
requires visibility into the network core as well as its edges. Moreover, testing and
debugging are eased by the ability to quickly rewrite and deploy new queries to any
OpenFlow+ switch in the network—rather than reprovisioning capture hardware for
each new requirement. Our approach provides both of these features, lending it power,
and flexibility compared to current methods.
Regardless of how queries are eventually deployed—on purely software switches
running OVS extensions or on hardware—it remains vital for switches to process packets
as quickly as possible, which is not feasible without limitations on the expressive
power of packet-matching. We respect this constraint by producing rules with packet-
matching criteria that echo existing fast-match instruction sets while also containing
state-modification actions that can be executed asynchronously.
Soundness and Completeness In an environment such as a switch, which lacks atomic-
ity guarantees, the race between processing events and advancing state means that some
amount of both unsoundness (false positives) and incompleteness (false negatives) are
unavoidable for stateful queries. Switches are optimized to forward traffic rapidly (on the
order of micro- or nanoseconds); rule update is relatively glacial (whole milliseconds).
Moreover, switches have limited queue space, and may drop packets under heavy traffic
conditions. To avoid these problems, one might imagine forcing the switch to process
only one packet at a time. While intuitively appealing, this is unacceptable in a network
that handles even a modest amount of traffic. These challenges are intrinsic to the domain,
and while monitoring directly on switches (as opposed to on a server) greatly reduces
network-induced inaccuracy, we leave the larger problem for future work. Probabilistic
approaches such as traffic sampling [35] present an especially promising avenue.
Scaling, Hardware, and Future Work As our evaluation shows, performance degrades
as the number of active tables increases. Our current approach installs each new run of
AQ as a new block of OpenFlow+ rules in a fresh table. The system does this because,
in general, a single packet may advance multiple partially-completed runs. However,
it appears that full support for non-determinism is not always necessary. For instance,
when falsifying Property 3 (Sec. 2.1), a single packet can never advance two partially-
completed runs unless they are waiting for different observations. We therefore believe
that one table for each observation should suffice to capture the query, and that this can
be echoed in the formalism by partial determinization of AQ. Using only a constant
number of tables—where possible—would drastically improve performance. Moreover,
using a fixed number of tables makes pipelining possible, easing application of our
techniques in purpose-built forwarding hardware.
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A Automaton Construction
Fig. 7 gives the complete transition-function definition (Sec. 3).
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δloopi = {((Oi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Oi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ))
for every η, η̂, lpi , lτ , pi, and τ}
δoki = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi+1, η + [e, pi], ∅, pi, τ))
where pi |=η C}
δloopi = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ))
for every η, η̂, lpi , lτ , pi, and τ
unless pi = TICK and τ = lτ +D}
δoki = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi+1, η + [e, pi], ∅, pi, τ))
where pi |=η C}
δloopi = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ))
for every η, η̂, lpi , lτ , pi, and τ
unless pi |=η C or (pi=TICK and τ = lτ +D)
δoki = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi+1, η + [e, pi], ∅, pi, τ))
where pi = TICK and τ = lτ +D}
δloopi = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ))
for every η, η̂, lpi , lτ , pi, and τ, unless pi |=η A}
δblocki = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi, η, η̂′, lpi, lτ ))
where pi |=η A− [e2], and η̂′ = η̂ ∪ {∅+ [e2, pi]}}
δoki = {((Qi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ), (pi, τ), (Qi+1, η + [e2, pi], ∅, pi, τ))
where pi |=η B and
∀ηblock ∈ η̂ | ∃f ∈ FIELDS | getf(e2, φ(f)) 6= ηblock(e2.f)
Fig. 7: Producing the non-deterministic transition relation for a query [O1, ..., On]. For each i,
δi equals the union of all δxi . The notation A− [e] means the subset of match predicate A with
all literals involving event e removed, and φ is the mapping on fields induced by equalities in the
blocking condition of an until. E.g., in Property 4, nwSrc maps to nwDst and vice versa.
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B Proof Sketch for Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Let T be a trace and Q = [O1, ..., On] a query. Then T |= Q ⇐⇒ AQ
accepts T .
Proof Sketch. Note that AQ accepts T of length k if and only if there is some run
(O0, ∅, ∅,⊥, 0) pi1,τ1−−−→ ... pik,τk−−−→ (On, Fη, Fη̂, Flpi , Flτ ) of AQ for some η, η̂, lpi and lτ .
For the ← direction, if there is an execution of AQ accepting T then there is a
partition of T into non-empty traces t1, ..., tn (t1 ◦ ... ◦ tn = T ) such that the final
event in each ti coincides with a transition from some (Oi, η, η̂, lpi, lτ ) state to an
(Oi+1, η
′, η̂′, l′pi, l
′
τ ) state in the accepting execution. It suffices to show that, for each ti,
ti ◦ ... ◦ tn |=η,lτ ,lpi [Oi+1, ..., On]. This holds by construction of AQ.
The → direction proceeds similarly; given T |= Q we build a set of sub-traces
induced by a valid selection of indices (i in Fig. 2) and produce an accepting execution.
C Compiler Algorithm
The query-compilation algorithm appears in full below. As seen in Sec. 4, the compiler
recursively descends through each observation, building a corresponding set of switch
rules. Where match predicates involve negative literals, the compiler inserts shadow rules
(buildShadow) before the trigger rule (buildTrigger) that advances the state. Since only
one rule per table can apply, these block the trigger from applying. The buildUntilBlock
function produces rule that learns new shadow rules that prevent the observation from
being triggered as blocking events are seen.
In the algorithm, Match and Rule are constructors that generate new match criteria and
OpenFlow+ rules. Each observation contains a type field (ingress or egress), a matching
predicate (i.e., list of literals) pred, and in the case of until observations, a blocking
predicate blockPred. NEXT(o.type) denotes learning into the next unused table for o’s type.
This value starts at 0 and is incremented by the inc action. SAME indicates the rule is
installed into the same table as its parent.
compile(o: Observation, rest: List[Observation], depths: Map[Var, Int]):
ss := buildShadow(o.cond, depths)
t := buildTrigger(o, rest, depths)
if o.isUntil then
bs := buildUntilBlock(o, depths)
else
bs := {}
return (ss + t + bs)
buildShadow(p: List[Literal], depths: Map[Var, Int]):
ruleset := {}
for each (t1 != t2) in pred:
ruleset += Rule(o.time, NEXT(o.type), Match(t1, t2, depths), drop, None)
return ruleset
buildTrigger(o: Observation, rest: List[Observation], depths: Map[Var, Int]):
matches := {}
for each (t1 = t2) in o.pred:
matches += Match(t1, t2, depths)
if(rest.empty)
actions := {controller}
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else
newrules := compile(rest.first, rest.rest, depths+{o.var->d.max})
actions := {inc(o.type), learn(newrules)}
if(o.positive):
return Rule(o.time, NEXT(o.type), matches, actions, None)
else:
return Rule(o.time, NEXT(o.type), matches, {delete_all}, actions)
buildUntilBlock(o: Observation, depths: Map[Var, Int]):
fieldMap := buildFieldMap(o.blockPred) // buildFieldMap (not shown) builds the relation
ss := buildShadow(o.block, depths) // φ in Fig. 4. E.g., in Property 4,
// nwSrc maps to nwDst and vice versa.
restricted := o.blockPred - {literals using trigger var}
matches := {}
for each literal (t1 = t2) in restricted:
matches += Match(t1, t2, depths)
blockmatch := {}
for each entry (fld1 -> fld2) in fieldMap:
blockmatch += Match(fld2, fld1, depths)
actions := {learn(Rule(o.time, SAME, blockMatch, drop, None))}
t := Rule(o.time, SAME, matches, actions)
return (ss + t)
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